largely concern areas the staff reviewed after the SGTR event on March 14, 1993. Specifically, the Petitioners repeated several of the procedural and operator weaknesses that were described and evaluated in the staff's AIT report (Inspection Report 50–529/93–14, dated April 16, 1993).[28] Specifically, the AIT report stated that the use of a diagnostic logic tree caused the operators to misdiagnose the SGTR event twice and subsequently enter a Functional Recovery Procedure, contributing substantially to the delay in isolating the faulted steam generator. The staff concluded in its safety evaluation of August 19, 1993, that the licensee's modifications to the EOPs and the subsequent operator training provide sufficient enhancement for both diagnosis and mitigation of various SGTR scenarios.

Additionally, the licensee recently revised its EOPs to make them consistent with Combustion Engineering Owners Group (CEOG) guidance (CEN 0152, Rev. 3[29]). NRC Inspection Report 50–528/50–529/50–530/95–12, dated July 27, 1995, documents the staff's observations on the ''high intensity team'' training conducted for each crew in preparation for implementing the EOPs. In the inspection report, the staff stated that the EOPs enhanced crew performance and allowed for greater flexibility in responding to events. As an example, during the simulator-based SGTR scenario, the crew was able to isolate the faulted SG within 14 minutes of the start of the event. In contrast, during the March 1993 Unit 2 SGTR event, operators took about 3 hours to isolate the faulted SG, partly because of restrictions in the EOPs in use at the time. The staff will further evaluate the effectiveness of EOPs during future licensed operator examinations.

On the basis of its review of the Petitioners' request that the licensee demonstrate that its EOPs for SGTR events are adequate and that plant operators are sufficiently trained in EOPs, the staff has concluded that the Petitioners have not presented a basis for further NRC action.

III. Conclusion

The institution of proceedings in response to a request pursuant to Section 2.206 is appropriate only when substantial health or safety issues have been raised. See Consolidated Edison Co. of New York (Indian Point, Units 1, 2, and 3), CLI–75–8, 2 NRC 173, 176 (1975), and Washington Public Power Supply System (WPPSS Nuclear Project No. 2), DD–84–7, 19 NRC 899, 923 (1984). This standard has been applied to the concerns raised by the Petitioners to determine whether the actions requested by the Petitioners are warranted. With regard to the specific requests made by the Petitioners discussed herein, the NRC staff finds no basis for taking additional actions beyond those described above. Accordingly, the Petitioners' requests for additional actions pursuant to Section 2.206, specifically Requests 1, 2, 3, 5, and 6 submitted in the Petitioners' supplement dated July 8, 1994, are denied. Accordingly, no action pursuant to Section 2.206 is being taken in this matter.

A copy of this Decision will be filed with the Secretary of the Commission for Commission review in accordance with 10 CFR § 2.206(c) of the Commission's regulations. As provided by this regulation, the Decision will constitute the final action of the Commission 25 days after issuance, unless the Commission, on its own motion, institutes a review of the Decision within that time.

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 25th day of June 1996.

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

William T. Russell,

Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.

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event, (b) simulator alarms occur within 2–3 minutes of an SGTR event, contrary to control room indications, (c) plant staff failed to fully respond to assembly notification, (d) plant staff failed to perform a formal evaluation of the safety significance of an abnormal crack growth in the Unit 2 SG.

[28] The licensee addressed the issues raised in the AIT report by implementing the necessary procedural changes and providing training. For example, with regard to the AIT finding (summarized by the Petitioners) regarding differences between alarm response on the simulator and in the control room, the staff's safety evaluation of August 19, 1993, stated that ''the simulator has been modified to more realistically model the plant, particularly the response of the radiation monitoring system to an SGTR.''

[29] A letter from the NRC to Combustion Engineering dated August 2, 1988, stated that, ''pending NRC final review and approval, CE facilities may base their plant-specific emergency operating procedures on Revision 3 of CEN–152. Should future NRC review reveal modifications to Revision 3 to be necessary, CE facilities would be expected to update their procedures to reflect the identified changes. Schedules for such changes should be based on perceived safety significance of the changes.'' The objective of the CEN–152 report is to describe the CEOG emergency procedure guidelines system. The report contains the methodology used to develop and validate the licensee's emergency procedure guidelines and information on the implementation of guidelines.

POSTAL SERVICE

Specifications for Postal Security Devices and Indicia (Postmarks)

AGENCY: Postal Service.

ACTION: Notice of proposed specifications with request for comments.

SUMMARY: Historically, postage meters have been mechanical and electromechanical devices that (1) maintain through mechanical or electronic ''registers'' (postal security devices) an account of all postage printed and the remaining balance of prepaid postage, and (2) print postage postmarks (indicia) that are accepted by the Postal Service as evidence of the prepayment of postage. Two proposed specifications have been developed on these subjects, and are entitled ''Information Based Indicia Program (IBIP) PSD Specification'' and ''Information Based Indicia Program (IBIP) Indicia Specification.'' The U.S. Postal Service is seeking comments on these specifications.

The Postal Service also seeks comments on intellectual property issues raised by the specifications if adopted in present form. If an intellectual property issue includes patents or patent applications covering any implementations of the specifications, the comment should include a listing of such patents and applications and the license terms available for such patents and applications.

DATES: Comments on the two specifications must be received on or before September 30, 1996. Comments addressing intellectual property issues must be received on or before July 15, 1996. A general meeting on this subject is being planned for mid-July in Washington, DC. All persons who have expressed an interest in the proposed specifications will be invited to attend the meeting. This meeting will focus solely on technical aspects of the two specifications. Interested parties may submit questions by July 1, 1996 which will be considered for incorporation into the meeting presentations.

ADDRESSES: Copies of the Indicium and Postal Security Device Specifications may be obtained from: Terry Goss, United States Postal Service, 475 L'Enfant Plaza SW, Room 8430, Washington, DC 20260–6807. Mail or deliver written comments to: Manager, Retail Systems and Equipment, United States Postal Service, 475 L'Enfant Plaza SW, Room 8430, Washington, DC 20260–6807. Copies of all written comments may be inspected and

photocopied between 9 a.m. and 4 p.m., Monday through Friday, at the above address.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Terry Goss at (202) 268–3757.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: There are approximately 1.5 million postage meters in use in the United States which collectively account for approximately $20 billion in postal revenue annually. The manufacture and use of postage meters is governed by Postal Service regulations (see 39 CFR Part 501; Domestic Mail Manual P030). For several years USPS has been actively proposing a solution of the problem of inadequate postage meter security. To respond to the threat of fraudulent use of meters by physical tampering, USPS intends to decertify and remove from the market, in risk-driven phases, all postage meters using mechanical registers. Another problem USPS has faced is that currently available meter indicia are susceptible to counterfeiting. The Postal Service is exploring using current technology special purpose units such as computers and independent printers to provide prepaid postage.

The Information Based Indicia Program (IBIP) is a Postal Service initiative supporting the development and implementation of a new form of postage indicia. This IBIP specification is intended to address the counterfeiting threat. USPS envisions that the new indicium standard may eventually support new or existing products and services. Specific products and services have not been determined. An ''IBIP indicium'' substitutes for a postage stamp or a postage meter imprint as evidence of the fact that postage has been paid on mailpieces. An ''IBIP Postal Secure Device'' provides cryptographic signature, financial accounting, indicium creation, device authorization, and audit functions.

The goal for IBIP is to provide an environment in which customers can apply postage through new technologies that improve postal revenue security. The IBIP indicia is expected eventually to replace all metered postage imprints that rely on letter press printing technology. This requires a new form of postage indicia and the adoption of standards to facilitate industry investment and product development.

The Postal Security Device will provide security services to support the creation of the new ''IBIP indicium.'' The PSD provides security-critical functions for IBIP customers. The PSD will be a hardware component for use with either a computer-based or postage meter-based host system. Each PSD will be a unique security device. The PSD core security functions are cryptographic digital signature generation and verification, and the secure management of the registers that track the remaining amount of money available for indicium creation (i.e., descending register) and the total postage value used by the PSD (i.e., ascending register). The PSD will be a tamper-resistant device that may contain an internal random number generator, various storage registers, a date/time clock, and other circuits necessary to perform these functions. The PSD will comply with Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) 140–1 and will be validated through the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Computer Systems Laboratory's Cryptographic Module Validation Program.

It is emphasized that this proposed standard is being published for comments and is subject to final definition. In particular, evaluation of alternative digital signing, printing standards, and symbology is continuing.

Although exempt from the notice and comment requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act (5 U.S.C. 553 (b), (c)) regarding proposed rulemaking by 39 U.S.C. 410 (a), the Postal Service invites public comments on the proposed specifications.

Stanley F. Mires,

Chief Counsel, Legislative.

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BILLING CODE 7710–12–P

PRESIDENTIAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON GULF WAR VETERANS' ILLNESSES

Meeting

AGENCY: Presidential Advisory Committee on Gulf War Veterans' Illnesses.

ACTION: Notice of open meeting.

SUMMARY: This notice is hereby given to announce an open meeting of a panel of the Presidential Advisory Committee on Gulf War Veterans' Illnesses. The panel will discuss the biology and psychology of stress and will receive comment from members of the public. Dr. David A. Hamburg will chair this panel meeting.

DATES: July 23, 1996, 9:00 a.m.–4:00 p.m.

PLACE: Omni Netherland Plaza, 35 W. Fifth Street, Cincinnati, OH 45202.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The President established the Presidential Advisory Committee on Gulf War Veterans' Illnesses by Executive Order 12961, May 26, 1995. The purpose of this Advisory Committee is to review and provide recommendations on the full range of government activities associated with Gulf War veterans' illnesses. The Advisory Committee reports to the President through the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Health and Human Services, and the Secretary of Veterans Affairs. Advisory Committee members have expertise relevant to the functions of the Committee and are appointed by the President from non-Federal sectors.

Tentative Agenda

Tuesday, July 23, 1996

9:00 a.m. Call to order and opening remarks
9:10 a.m. Public comment
10:50 a.m. Break
11:10 a.m. Biology and psychology of stress: general overview
12:15 p.m. Lunch
1:30 p.m. Stress-related findings of the Department of Defense's Comprehensive Clinical Evaluation Program
2:00 p.m. Stress-related findings of the Department of Veterans Affairs' Persian Gulf Health Registry
2:30 p.m. Break
2:45 p.m. Risk factors and protective factors associated with differential outcomes in a cohort of Gulf War veterans
3:15 p.m. U.S. Army's Human Dimensions Research Program
3:40 p.m. Committee and staff discussion
4:00 p.m. Adjourn

A final agenda will be available at the meeting.

Public Participation

The meeting is open to the public. Members of the public who wish to make oral statements should contact the Advisory Committee at the address or telephone number listed below at least five business days prior to the meeting. Reasonable provisions will be made to include on the agenda presentations from individuals who have not yet had an opportunity to address the Advisory Committee. Priority will be given to Gulf War veterans and their families. The panel chair is empowered to conduct the meeting in a fashion that will facilitate the orderly conduct of business. People who wish to file written statements with the Advisory Committee may do so at any time.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Michael E. Kowalok, Presidential Advisory Committee on Gulf War Veterans' Illnesses, 1411 K Street, N.W., suite 1000, Washington, DC 20005–